Willingness to Continue with Software Projects: Effects of Feedback Direction and Optimism under High and Low Accountability Conditions by Wei, Kwok-Kee et al.
 Heng, Tan & Wei/Software Projects: Feedback Direction and Optimism 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 4 No. 4, pp.171-194/September 2003 171 
 
 
 
RESEARCH ARTICLE
 
 
Willingness to Continue with Software Projects: 
Effects of Feedback Direction and Optimism under High 
and Low Accountability Conditions∗ 
 
Cheng-Suang Heng 
Department of Management Science and Engineering 
Stanford University 
hengcs@comp.nus.edu.sg 
 
Bernard C.Y. Tan 
Department of Information Systems 
National University of Singapore 
btan@comp.nus.edu.sg 
 
Kwok-Kee Wei 
Department of Information Systems 
National University of Singapore 
weikk@comp.nus.edu.sg 
 
Abstract 
 
The willingness of managers to continue with software projects can be both beneficial 
and troubling. Management optimism can help bring promising projects to fruition, but 
can also cause valuable resources to be expended on faltering projects. This study 
examines three factors that can affect the willingness of managers to continue with 
software projects: feedback direction, feedback optimism, and accountability. Feedback 
direction is the objective information reflecting project prospects. Feedback optimism is 
the subjective mode with which the objective information has been framed. 
Accountability is the extent to which the manager feels responsible for project outcomes. 
Results of a study that manipulated these three factors showed that the effects of 
feedback direction and feedback optimism on willingness to continue with software 
projects were additive (either factor alone affected willingness to continue with software 
projects) when accountability was high but were interactive (both factors jointly affected 
willingness to continue with software projects) when accountability was low. These 
findings have useful implications for practice and further research. 
                                                          
∗ Sirkka Jarvenpaa was the accepting senior editor for this paper; Ann Majchrzak, Rajiv 
Sabherwal, and Iris Vessey were blind reviewers for this paper.  
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Introduction 
 
Managers of software projects, particularly projects involving the development of generic 
software packages, face keen competition and uncertain prospects for success. These 
managers often must make difficult decisions about whether or not to continue with their 
projects in an uncertain market. Sometimes, decisions to terminate projects can cause 
promising software projects to be abandoned too early (Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski 
1991). Other times, decisions to continue with projects can bring about escalation 
tendencies (Staw 1997) that cause valuable resources to be poured into troubled 
software projects that ultimately fail to deliver the intended outputs (Keil et al. 1995; 
Newman and Sabherwal 1996). 
 
In order to make better decisions, managers often solicit feedback on project prospects 
(Bowen 1987). Two important aspects of feedback are direction and optimism. Feedback 
direction is the objective information reflecting project prospects (Bowen 1987): positive 
feedback indicates good prospects while negative feedback reflects poor prospects for 
success. Feedback optimism is the subjective mode with which the objective information 
has been framed (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Optimistic framing portrays objective 
information in a favorable light (e.g., capture 50% of total market share relative to 
competitor) while pessimistic framing depicts objective information in an unfavorable 
tone (e.g., fail to capture 50% of total market share relative to competitor). Both 
feedback direction and optimism have been found to affect human decisions. To our 
knowledge, prior studies have never examined both factors together in the context of 
software projects. 
 
Instead of directly impacting management decisions, feedback direction and optimism 
may not directly affect management decisions but be moderated by accountability, or the 
extent to which the manager feels responsible for the projects’ outcomes (Brockner et al. 
1986; Caldwell and O’Reilly 1982). High accountability situations are likely to arise if the 
manager initiates the project and feels emotionally attached to it. Low accountability is 
likely to occur if the manager takes over the project from someone else and does not 
feel emotionally attached to it. Prior research has examined feedback direction and 
optimism in high accountability situations but not in low accountability situations (which 
can be particularly applicable to software projects, given high personnel turnover). 
 
This study examines the impact of feedback direction and optimism, under conditions of 
high and low accountability, on a manager’s willingness to continue with a software 
project (e.g., develop a generic software package). Specifically, it seeks to answer two 
research questions: (1) how may feedback direction and optimism jointly affect 
willingness to continue with software projects? And (2) how may the effects of feedback 
direction and optimism be moderated by accountability? This study contributes to the 
software project management literature in two important ways. First, by simultaneously 
varying feedback direction and optimism, it adds to our understanding of how managers 
make decisions when given confirmatory (optimistic framing of positive feedback or 
pessimistic framing of negative feedback) versus contradictory evidence (pessimistic 
framing of positive feedback or optimistic framing of negative feedback) on their software 
projects. Second, by varying accountability, it gives us some clues as to whether the 
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results reported for software project managers operating in high accountability situations 
may also be applicable to software project managers working in low accountability 
situations. Results from both situations are likely to be relevant to the practice of 
software project management. 
 
Literature and Hypotheses 
 
Feedback Direction 
 
Feedback helps to reduce uncertainty and can give project managers confidence during 
decision-making (Remus et al. 1996; Schwenk 1986). Thus, managers often engage 
external consultants or experts who have no vested interests in the projects to provide 
credible and reliable assessments of project prospects (Liden and Mitchell 1985; 
Vancouver and Morrison 1995). Often in the form of market forecasts, feedback is 
considered positive if predicted prospects exceed original expectations and negative if 
the reverse is true (Bowen 1987). Such objective assessments can be particularly 
important for project managers who must be vigilant of competing software products that 
may impact the market prospects of their own software packages.  
 
When project managers receive positive feedback, suggesting favorable prospects for 
success, they are likely to want to proceed with their projects so as to derive the benefits 
expected from completing the projects (Walsh and Henderson 1989). Therefore, positive 
feedback should be associated with greater willingness to continue with software 
projects. But few empirical studies to date have involved positive feedback, so little is 
known about how it influences managers’ decisions.1 
 
Numerous empirical studies have examined the impact of negative feedback on human 
decisions in various contexts, including software project management (e.g., Haunschild 
et al. 1994; Keil et al. 1995; Staw et al. 1997). The way project managers respond to 
negative feedback, implying unfavorable prospects for success, is varied (Anderson and 
Rodin 1989; McCain 1986; Schaubroeck and Williams 1993). Negative feedback 
sometimes causes project managers to want to terminate the projects. This is especially 
true when there are substantial discrepancies from the original expectations and they 
are perceived to be of a long-term nature (Barton et al. 1989; Kernan and Lord 1989; 
McCain 1986). Such behavior can be explained by the rational cognitive model, which 
posits that people would choose to discontinue with courses of action if their original 
objectives are unlikely to be achieved. Indeed, software projects, particularly those 
involving the development of generic software packages, have often been terminated 
when project managers receive negative feedback. At other times, negative feedback 
causes project managers to want to complete the projects. By showing the gap between 
the current situation and original expectations, negative feedback may motivate people 
to continue in the hope of overcoming it (Anderson and Rodin, 1989; Vandewalle and 
Cummings 1997). By continuing with a project, people convey that they understand the 
problems and are now trying to overcome them (Schwenk 1986; Walsh and Henderson 
1989). At the extreme, continuing with a clearly doomed project can lead to the 
                                                          
1 Although Staw’s (1976) early study examined both positive and negative feedback, Staw (1997) 
himself and others (e.g., Schoorman and Holahan 1996) have noted manipulation problems with 
that early study. Subsequent studies have omitted positive feedback, making it impossible to 
assess the impact of feedback direction on human decisions.  
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escalation of commitment phenomenon (Brockner 1992; Keil et al. 1995; Staw and Ross 
1987).  
 
It is possible that prior research has focused on negative feedback (and ignored positive 
feedback) for two reasons. First, human decisions under negative feedback defy the 
fundamental tenet of economic rationality. Second, people are often keener to seek 
explanations for negative rather than positive results (Conlon and Parks 1987). 
Nevertheless, because prior empirical studies have not examined positive and negative 
feedback simultaneously, it is not known whether positive feedback would indeed bring 
about greater willingness to continue with software projects than negative feedback 
(which has varied effects). 
 
Feedback Optimism 
 
Providers of feedback often frame it in tones through their choice of words or selective 
emphasis of points (Frisch 1993). They may frame feedback intentionally (e.g., due to 
prejudices or biases) or unintentionally (e.g., due to moods or optimism levels), and the 
same piece of (objective) feedback may be framed either optimistically or pessimistically. 
For example, when presenting the market forecast that a generic software package can 
capture 50% of the total market share, the report may emphasize the 50% of total 
market share captured by the software package (optimistic framing) or the 50% of total 
market share lost to competing software packages (pessimistic framing). When project 
managers receive feedback from external consultants about their software projects, it is 
likely to reflect the optimism or pessimism of the consultants themselves, and like 
feedback direction, feedback optimism may affect human decisions (Frisch 1993; 
McFarland and Miller 1994). 
 
Literature in the cognitive perspective arena describes how framing may affect human 
decisions (Davis and Bobko 1986; Dunegan 1993). People tend to evaluate key 
attributes of the feedback and how these have been framed. People have been reported 
to favor feedback (key attributes) framed optimistically compared to feedback (key 
attributes) framed pessimistically (Dunegan 1993; Schoorman et al. 1994). 
 
As mentioned previously, positive or negative feedback may undergo optimistic or 
pessimistic framing. For market forecasts on generic software packages, positive and 
negative feedback can come in the form of bigger and smaller than expected market 
share, respectively. When presenting such forecasts, providers of optimistically framed 
positive feedback would highlight the bigger than expected market share that the 
software packages can capture, whereas providers of pessimistically framed positive 
feedback would focus on the smaller than expected remaining market share that the 
software packages cannot capture. Likewise, optimistically framed negative feedback 
would focus on the smaller than expected market share that the software packages can 
capture while pessimistically framed negative feedback would emphasize the bigger 
than expected remaining market share that the software packages cannot capture (see 
Figure 1). 
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    Optimistic framing Pessimistic framing 
   (market share captured) (market share not 
captured) 
Emphasize the Emphasize the 
bigger than expected smaller than expected 
Positive 
feedback 
(bigger than 
expected 
market share) 
market share captured market share not captured
Emphasize the Emphasize the 
smaller than expected bigger than expected 
Negative 
feedback 
(smaller than 
expected 
market share) 
market share captured market share not captured
Figure 1.  Feedback Direction and Optimism 
 
Logically, pessimistic framing may alleviate the impact of positive feedback, whereas 
optimistic framing may ameliorate the impact of negative feedback. However, this 
contention has not been empirically examined. Researchers have never studied how 
feedback optimism in relation to positive feedback2 affects human decisions. Given that 
feedback direction and optimism have never been simultaneously investigated, it is not 
clear how project managers would make decisions when given confirmatory (optimistic 
framing of positive feedback or pessimistic framing of negative feedback) versus 
contradictory evidence (pessimistic framing of positive feedback or optimistic framing of 
negative feedback) on their software projects. Yet, project managers often have to make 
decisions under such circumstances. 
 
Accountability 
 
How accountable project managers are for their software projects varies in practice. 
Self-inference theory suggests that people tend to feel accountable for projects if the 
outcomes reflect their personal traits or capabilities (Brockner et al. 1986; Sandelands et 
al. 1988). This is especially true in situations where they played a key role in initiating the 
projects (Schoorman and Holahan 1996). Self-justification theory posits that such people 
often want to vindicate themselves for their decisions to initiate the projects and they 
typically do so by trying to make sure the project outcomes are good (Bobocel and 
Meyer 1994; Caldwell and O’Reilly 1982). Hence, project managers who have initiated 
their software projects are likely to have a higher level of accountability than project 
managers who took over their projects from their predecessors or colleagues. Both types 
of project managers are common in the context of software projects. 
 
The level of accountability may affect the way project managers process feedback about 
their software projects (Sandelands et al. 1988). Keil (1995) observes that managers 
who are highly accountable for software projects tend to develop emotional attachments 
to the projects so much so that they pay very careful attention to project information. 
Therefore, when level of accountability is high, project managers tend to be sensitive to 
information received about their software projects and may be particularly susceptible to 
the effects of feedback direction and optimism. 
 
                                                          
2 Empirical studies (e.g., Bazerman 1984; Northcraft and Neale 1986; Whyte 1986) have 
neglected positive feedback and concentrated on optimistic versus pessimistic framing of 
negative feedback. 
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Prior research on feedback direction (see Section 2.1) has mainly been carried out in 
high accountability situations. As discussed earlier, positive feedback should generally 
cause people to be more willing to continue with their software projects because the 
prospects for success are good. But negative feedback may elicit varied responses, 
depending on circumstances, with some people being more willing and others being less 
willing to continue. Given the likely common responses for positive feedback and the 
varied responses for negative feedback, positive feedback should result in a greater 
willingness of people to continue with their software projects compared to negative 
feedback. 
 
Hypothesis 1: When accountability is high, people given positive feedback will be more 
willing to continue with a software project than people given negative feedback. 
 
Researchers have also carried out studies on feedback optimism primarily (see Section 
2.2) in high accountability situations. Again, as discussed above, the attribute framing 
literature suggests that people tend to respond more favorably to optimistically framed 
feedback than to pessimistically framed feedback. Therefore, feedback optimism can 
cause people to be more willing to continue with their software projects. Empirical results 
across a variety of situations (e.g., Davis and Bobko 1986; Dunegan 1993) have 
supported the predictions of the literature. 
 
Hypothesis 2: When accountability is high, people given optimistically framed feedback 
will be more willing to continue with a software project than people given pessimistically 
framed feedback. 
 
Prior empirical research has neglected low accountability situations, which occur when 
people inherit projects from others and do not have much emotional attachment to them 
(Kirby and Davis 1998; Schoorman and Holahan 1996). In the context of software 
projects, it is common for project managers to take over projects from predecessors or 
colleagues for a variety of reasons (e.g., personnel turnover and internal transfers). 
When accountability is low, project managers tend to pay less attention to project 
information and so should be less affected by feedback direction and optimism. Under 
such circumstances, they are likely to require strong mental stimuli to jolt them to act on 
projects (Levin et al. 1998). Optimistically framed positive feedback may provide a 
stronger stimulus than other forms of feedback to cause managers to be more willing to 
continue with their software projects. This observation would hold if feedback direction 
significantly affects human decisions to continue with software projects under conditions 
of optimistic framing but not under conditions of pessimistic framing (within a low 
accountability situation). 
 
Hypothesis 3a: When accountability is low, people given optimistically framed positive 
feedback will be more willing to continue with a software project than people given 
optimistically framed negative feedback. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: When accountability is low, people given pessimistically framed positive 
feedback and people given pessimistically framed negative feedback will be equally 
willing to continue with a software project. 
 
The above observation would also hold if feedback optimism significantly affects human 
decisions to continue with software projects under conditions of positive feedback but 
not under conditions of negative feedback (within a low accountability situation). 
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Hypothesis 4a: When accountability is low, people given optimistically framed positive 
feedback will be more willing to continue with a software project than people given 
pessimistically framed positive feedback. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: When accountability is low, people given optimistically framed negative 
feedback and people given pessimistically framed negative feedback will be equally 
willing to continue with a software project. 
 
Methodology 
 
The laboratory experiment used in this study had a 2x2x2 factorial design, manipulating 
feedback direction (positive versus negative), feedback optimism (optimistic framing 
versus pessimistic framing), and accountability (high versus low). All manipulations were 
checked based on responses of subjects to several questions at the end of the 
experiment (see Section 4.1). The experimental materials are presented in the 
Appendix. 
 
Operationalization of Feedback Direction 
 
For software projects involving the development of in-house systems, internal feedback 
often guides management decisions (e.g., information on the software development 
process). However, for software projects involving the development of generic packages 
for sale (i.e., the context of this study), external feedback (e.g., market forecasts) tends 
to impact the success of projects more than internal feedback. Therefore, these project 
managers tend to pay more attention to external than to internal feedback (Vancouver 
and Morrison 1995). Consequently, in line with previous studies (e.g., Conlon and 
Garland 1993; Schaubroeck and Williams 1993), feedback direction is manipulated 
using market forecasts. 
 
In the case scenario given to subjects, they were told that CONFIG (their own software 
product) was projected, by an external consultant, to be able to capture 50% of the total 
market demand at the beginning of the development effort. The remaining 50% of the 
total market demand would be captured by CHAMPFIG (a competing software product). 
A midpoint of 50% was used to prevent subjects from forming preconceived biases for or 
against the viability of CONFIG with respect to CHAMPFIG. We then provided feedback 
to subjects in the form of a new market forecast midway through the development effort 
for CONFIG. In line with Bowen (1987), who considered feedback as positive if original 
expectations are exceeded and negative if otherwise, we operationalized positive 
feedback using a better than initially projected new market forecast for CONFIG. Under 
this treatment, we told subjects that the same external consultant issued a new market 
forecast suggesting that CONFIG would be able to capture 75% of the total market 
demand (upper quartile). We operationalized negative feedback by telling subjects that 
the same external consultant issued a new market forecast suggesting that CONFIG 
would be able to capture 25% of the total market demand (lower quartile). 
 
Operationalization of Feedback Optimism 
 
Following prior studies, we manipulated feedback optimism through the emphasis and 
choice of words (that reflected the subjective level of optimism) when presenting the 
feedback (the new market forecast) to subjects (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levin et 
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al. 1998). When framing optimistically, we emphasized the percentage of total market 
demand CONFIG would capture, and when framing pessimistically, we emphasized the 
percentage of total market demand CONFIG would fail to capture, in the new market 
forecast by the same consultant. In both cases, the predicted market share for CONFIG 
was the same at 75%. Likewise, optimistically framed negative feedback would 
emphasize that CONFIG would capture 25% of the total market demand while 
pessimistically framed negative feedback would emphasize that CONFIG would fail to 
capture 75% of the total market demand. Again in both cases, the predicted market 
share for CONFIG was the same at 25%. 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the manipulation for the various combinations of feedback direction 
and optimism. Such manipulations are realistic because, in practice, good news is 
sometimes framed pessimistically and bad news is sometimes framed optimistically, 
either intentionally or unintentionally, when presented to managers (Frisch 1993). 
 
    Optimistic framing Pessimistic framing 
   (emphasized capture) (emphasized fail to capture)
CONFIG would CONFIG would 
capture fail to capture 
Positive 
feedback 
(predicted 
market share 
was 75%) 
75% of total market 
demand 
25% of total market 
demand 
CONFIG would CONFIG would 
capture fail to capture 
Negative 
feedback 
(predicted 
market share 
was 25%) 
25% of total market 
demand 
75% of total market 
demand 
Figure 2.  Manipulation for Feedback Direction and Optimism 
 
Operationalization of Accountability 
 
As in prior studies, we manipulated accountability by direct assignment of subjects to a 
role (Bobocel and Meyer 1994; Kirby and Davis, 1998).3 For the high accountability 
treatment, subjects played the role of a director who had championed the CONFIG 
software project. They were responsible for persuading top management to initiate the 
project and therefore were likely to be more accountable for project outcome. They were 
currently managing the project. For the low accountability treatment, subjects played the 
role of a director who had not championed the CONFIG software project, but whose 
predecessor was responsible for persuading top management to initiate the project. 
They were asked to take over the project after it had started because their predecessor 
left the company. Since they did not initiate the project, they were likely to be less 
accountable for project outcome. They were currently managing the project. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Although some studies operationalized accountability by allowing (or not allowing) subjects to 
choose the projects, this study did not adopt such an approach because the effects of 
accountability and choice could be confounded (Bobocel and Meyer 1994; Schoorman and 
Holahan 1996). 
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Task and Procedure 
 
To begin, subjects received the case scenario, which was adapted from Keil et al. (1995) 
and Whyte (1991). They played the role of a director of a computer software company, 
who was managing the CONFIG software project (developing a generic database 
system with advanced artificial intelligence capabilities for sale in the market). At the 
beginning of the CONFIG project, a study by an external consultant concluded that 
CONFIG would capture 50% of the total market demand while the remaining 50% would 
be captured by CHAMPFIG (a competing software product which has the same 
capabilities as CONFIG). Depending on their accountability treatment, subjects were 
either responsible or not responsible for persuading top management to initiate the 
CONFIG project. 
 
Midway through the CONFIG project (after spending 50% of the budget and completing 
50% of the project), the scenario described that the director engaged the same external 
consultant to conduct a new market forecast. The scenario stated the 50% midpoint for 
sunk cost and completion level because too high a level could bring about escalation of 
commitment tendencies, whereas too low a level could lead to indifference toward 
competition (Conlon and Garland 1993; Keil et al. 1995). Depending on their treatment 
for feedback direction, the consultant gave the subjects either positive feedback 
(increased market share) or negative feedback (reduced market share). Depending on 
their treatment for feedback optimism, the consultant gave the feedback using either an 
optimistic emphasis (focusing on percentage of market demand CONFIG could capture) 
or a pessimistic emphasis (focusing on percentage of market demand CONFIG could 
not capture). Although this simple feedback from the consultant might be considered to 
be too little project information, it reflects many real-life scenarios where project 
managers suffer from a lack of information due to a variety of reasons (e.g., 
unavailability of information about competing products, insufficient resources to engage 
better consultants, or inadequate time to gather more information).  
 
After evaluating the feedback from the consultant, subjects had to state their willingness 
to continue with the CONFIG software project in terms of a probability (0% meaning 
definitely not continue and 100% meaning definitely continue) (Keil et al. 1995). This 
variable was the dependent variable of the study. Before they departed, subjects 
provided their background information for control checks, completed a questionnaire that 
elicited responses for manipulation checks, and took part in a debriefing session. 
 
Subjects 
 
A total of 134 senior undergraduates enrolled in an information systems course at a 
large university voluntarily completed this study. On average, they were 21.6 years old. 
About 58% were males and 42% were females. Subjects were randomly assigned to 
one of the eight treatment conditions to control for the impact of their background on the 
results. The success of this random assignment had been checked (see Section 4.1). 
 
Analyses and Results 
 
All statistical tests were carried out at a 5% level of significance. Results at a 10% level 
of marginal significance were also acknowledged. 
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Manipulation and Control Checks 
 
We assessed the manipulation of feedback direction, feedback optimism, and 
accountability using the combined scores for two questions. All questions were anchored 
on a 7-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). The 
questions we used to check the manipulation of feedback direction were “The 
consultant’s report is good news for the CONFIG project,” and “The consultant’s market 
share assessment shows that the CONFIG project has good prospects.” Consistent with 
the experimental manipulation, subjects under the positive feedback treatment agreed to 
these questions to a significantly greater extent than subjects under the negative 
feedback treatment (t = 3.19, p < 0.01).4 Questions assessing the manipulation of 
feedback optimism were “The consultant adopts an optimistic attitude when preparing 
the report,” and “The consultant takes a positive perspective when presenting the 
findings.” Again, consistent with the experimental manipulation, subjects under the 
optimistic framing treatment agreed to these questions to a significantly greater extent 
than subjects under the pessimistic framing treatment (t = 2.77, p < 0.01).5 Questions 
checking the manipulation of accountability were “I am accountable for the success of 
the CONFIG project,” and “The outcome of the CONFIG project is important to me.” 
Consistent with the experimental manipulation, subjects under the high accountability 
treatment agreed to these questions to a significantly greater extent than subjects under 
the low accountability treatment (t = 3.27, p < 0.01). In summary, the manipulation of the 
three independent variables appeared to be successful. 
 
ANOVA tests showed that subjects in the various treatments did not differ significantly in 
terms of age and work experience. Mann-Whitney tests revealed that the gender ratio of 
the subjects did not differ significantly across the various treatments. Controls over 
subject background, enforced through randomization, appeared to be effective. 
 
Hypotheses Tests 
 
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for the dependent variable. Table 2 reports the 
results of an ANOVA test involving the three independent variables (feedback direction, 
feedback optimism, and accountability) and the dependent variable. Since the 
dependent variable could not satisfy homogeneity and normality requirements 
simultaneously, we confirmed all significant results with Mann-Whitney tests and post-
hoc t-tests. We found main effects for feedback direction (F = 6.73, p < 0.02), feedback 
optimism (F = 4.41, p < 0.04), and accountability (F = 4.07, p < 0.05). In addition, there 
was an interaction between feedback direction and feedback optimism (F = 5.90, p < 
0.02), as well as a three-way interaction involving all independent variables (F = 5.96, p 
< 0.02). The interpretation of the three-way interaction should take precedence (Keppel 
1991). To test the hypotheses, we used simple effect analyses (Keppel 1991), which 
decomposed the data along accountability. 
 
                                                          
4 Subjects under the pessimistically framed positive feedback treatment also agreed to these 
questions to a greater extent than subjects under the optimistically framed negative feedback 
treatment (t = 1.84, p < 0.07). Feedback direction did not appear to confound with feedback 
optimism. 
5 Subjects under the optimistically framed negative feedback treatment also agreed to these 
questions to a greater extent than subjects under the pessimistically framed positive feedback 
treatment (t = 1.89, p < 0.07). Again, feedback direction did not appear to confound with feedback 
optimism. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable 
Feedback Feedback Willingness to continue Cell size Accountability 
direction optimism Mean Std. dev.   
High Positive Optimistic 79.33 12.8 15 
    Pessimistic 69.41 17.84 17 
  Negative Optimistic 70 20.31 17 
    Pessimistic 60 21.79 17 
Low Positive Optimistic 78.24 18.11 17 
    Pessimistic 55.88 28.08 17 
  Negative Optimistic 51.76 17.76 17 
    Pessimistic 64.12 23.73 17 
 
Table 2.  Results of ANOVA Test 
  DF SS F p 
Feedback direction (FD) 1 2858.4 6.73 0.011* 
Feedback optimism (FO) 1 1871.32 4.41 0.038* 
Accountability (AC) 1 1727.06 4.07 0.046* 
FD x FO 1 2506.23 5.90 0.017* 
FD x AC 1 0.54 0.00 0.972 
FO x AC 1 205.75 0.49 0.488 
FD x FO x AC 1 2528.99 5.96 0.016* 
* p < 0.05 
 
Under the high accountability treatment, both feedback direction (F = 4.15, p < 0.05) and 
feedback optimism (F = 4.69, p < 0.04) had main effects (see Table 3). We confirmed 
the result for feedback direction by a Mann-Whitney test (χ2 = 3.57, p < 0.05) and a post-
hoc t-test (t = 1.93, p < 0.06). Subjects given positive feedback were significantly more 
willing to continue with the project than subjects given negative feedback. Hypothesis 1 
was supported. We also confirmed the result for feedback optimism by a Mann-Whitney 
test (χ2 = 4.72, p < 0.03) and a post-hoc t-test (t = 2.07, p < 0.05). Subjects given 
optimistically framed feedback were significantly more willing to continue with the project 
than subjects given pessimistically framed feedback. Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
 
Table 3.   Results of ANOVA Test (High Accountability Treatment) 
  DF SS F p 
Feedback direction (FD) 1 1445.19 4.15 0.046* 
Feedback optimism (FO) 1 1632.28 4.69 0.034* 
FD x FO  1 0.03 0.00 0.993 
* p < 0.05 
 
Under the low accountability treatment, there was an interaction between feedback 
direction and feedback optimism (F = 10.27, p < 0.01) (see Table 4). We carried out two 
additional sets of analyses. First, we decomposed the data along feedback optimism. 
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Under the condition of optimistic framing, feedback direction had a main effect (t = 4.30, 
p < 0.01), confirmed by a Mann-Whitney test (χ2 = 12.63, p < 0.01) and a post-hoc t-test 
(t = 4.30, p < 0.01). Positive feedback yielded higher willingness to continue with the 
project than negative feedback (see Table 1). Under the condition of pessimistic framing, 
feedback direction had no effect (t = 0.92, p = 0.36). Positive and negative feedback 
yielded comparable willingness to continue with the project (see Table 1). Hypotheses 
3a and 3b were supported. 
 
Table 4.  Results of ANOVA Test (Low Accountability Treatment) 
  DF SS F p 
Feedback direction (FD) 1 1413.24 2.83 0.097 
Feedback optimism (FO) 1 425 0.85 0.359 
FD x FO  1 5119.12 10.27 0.002* 
* p < 0.05 
 
Second, the data was decomposed along feedback direction. Under the condition of 
positive feedback, feedback optimism had a main effect (t = 2.76, p < 0.01), confirmed 
by a Mann-Whitney test (χ2 = 6.27, p < 0.02) and a post-hoc t-test (t = 2.76, p < 0.01). 
Optimistic framing yielded higher willingness to continue with the project compared to 
pessimistic framing (see Table 1). Under the condition of negative feedback, feedback 
optimism had a marginal main effect (t = 1.72, p < 0.10), confirmed by a Mann-Whitney 
test (χ2 = 2.68, p < 0.10) and a post-hoc t-test (t = 1.72, p < 0.10). Pessimistic framing 
produced higher willingness to continue with the project compared to optimistic framing 
(see Table 1). Hypothesis 4a was supported but Hypothesis 4b was not supported. 
Collectively, these two sets of analyses revealed that, when accountability was low, 
subjects were more willing to continue with the project when they were provided with 
optimistically framed positive feedback (this result was predicted) and, to a smaller 
extent, pessimistically framed negative feedback (this result was unexpected). 
 
Discussion and Implications 
 
Figure 3 summarizes the experimental findings, which answer the two research 
questions.  
 
Under conditions of high accountability, feedback direction and optimism appear to 
independently affect willingness to continue with software projects. But under conditions 
of low accountability, feedback direction and optimism seem to jointly affect willingness 
to continue with software projects. 
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Figure 3.   Graphical Summary of Results 
 
Discussion of High Accountability Condition 
 
Results of this study reveal that in high accountability situations, people tend to be more 
willing to continue with software projects (involving development of generic software 
packages) if they receive positive feedback and/or optimistically framed feedback. Thus, 
the effects of feedback direction and optimism on willingness to continue with software 
projects are additive under conditions of high accountability. Moreover, these results 
show that in high accountability situations, people tend to resolve contradictory evidence 
(pessimistic framing of positive feedback or optimistic framing of negative feedback) by 
raising their subjective perception of success and therefore have greater willingness to 
continue with software projects. But with confirmatory evidence (optimistic framing of 
positive feedback or pessimistic framing of negative feedback), subjective perception is 
less relevant. 
 
Prior research has investigated how varying degrees of negative feedback might affect 
human decisions in high accountability situations (e.g., Garland et al. 1990; Haunschild 
et al. 1994). Results indicate that people tend to ignore objective (negative) feedback 
and instead base their decisions on some situational factor (e.g., the gap between the 
current situation and original expectations, or their eagerness to see the situation turn 
around). This study adds to these prior findings by showing that people in high 
accountability situations demonstrate more willingness to continue with software projects 
when exposed to positive feedback as opposed to negative feedback. Moreover, the 
variance in willingness to continue tends to be smaller when people are given positive 
feedback compared with negative feedback (see Table 1). The smaller variance in the 
positive feedback condition suggests that managers highly accountable for software 
projects may have focused on a common factor when making their decisions, and this 
factor is likely to be the objective (positive) feedback. The larger variance in the negative 
feedback condition confirms prior results and suggests that managers highly 
accountable for software projects may have considered a number of factors when 
arriving at their decisions, the objective (negative) feedback being just one. 
 
Prior studies have also examined people who are highly accountable for projects might 
be affected by negative feedback that is framed differently (e.g., Davis and Bobko 1986; 
Schoorman et al. 1994). Empirical studies on attribute framing demonstrate that negative 
feedback can induce greater willingness to continue with projects if it has been framed 
Hen, Tan & Wei/Software Projects: Feedback Direction & Optimism 
184 Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 171-194/September 2003 
optimistically rather than pessimistically. Results of this study agree with the predictions 
from the attribute framing literature because subjects might have treated the market 
forecast from the consultant as an attribute (with optimistic or pessimistic framing 
characteristics depending on treatment). These results also add to the attribute framing 
literature by illustrating that the effects of framing observed for negative feedback can be 
extended to positive feedback. In other words, managers highly accountable for software 
projects are likely to have greater willingness to continue with their projects if feedback 
(regardless of positive or negative) has been framed optimistically rather than 
pessimistically. 
 
Discussion of Low Accountability Condition 
 
This study also reveals that in low accountability situations, people may be more willing 
to continue with software projects if they are provided with optimistically framed positive 
feedback or, to a smaller extent, pessimistically framed negative feedback. Therefore, 
the effects of feedback direction and optimism on willingness to continue with software 
projects are interactive under conditions of low accountability. Moreover, these results 
show that in low accountability situations, people tend to resolve contradictory evidence 
(pessimistic framing of positive feedback or optimistic framing of negative feedback) by 
lowering their subjective perception of success and therefore have lesser willingness to 
continue with software projects. But with confirmatory evidence (optimistic framing of 
positive feedback or pessimistic framing of negative feedback), subjective perception is, 
again, less relevant. 
 
Contrary to prediction, subjects in low accountability situations not only demonstrated 
greater willingness to continue with software projects when given optimistically framed 
positive feedback but also when given pessimistically framed negative feedback. The 
notion of mental stimulus provides a plausible explanation for this observed interaction. 
When people are not highly accountable for projects, they usually need a strong stimulus 
to jolt them to pay attention to the projects (Levin et al. 1998). As hypothesized, 
optimistically framed positive feedback seemed to be a strong enough stimulus to induce 
subjects to be more willing to continue with software projects. But unexpectedly, 
pessimistically framed negative feedback also constituted a strong enough stimulus to 
cause subjects to behave likewise. For both these treatments, the strong stimulus might 
have resulted from the large percentage figure on market forecast (capture 75% of total 
market demand or fail to capture 75% of total market demand) presented to subjects 
(see Figure 2). 
 
The greater willingness to continue with software projects that arose from optimistically 
framed positive feedback is a rational outcome, but the marginally greater willingness to 
continue with software projects that arose from pessimistically framed negative feedback 
is less intuitive. Insights provided by the subjects during debriefing reveal three possible 
explanations. First, the low accountability treatment involved a change of management 
for the project. People might have attributed the poor results (pessimistically framed 
negative feedback) to the incompetence of their predecessor in monitoring the market 
(Walsh and Henderson 1989). Staw et al. (1983) observed that failure tends to be 
blamed on external weaknesses but success tends to be attributed to internal strengths. 
Thus, people might demonstrate greater willingness to continue with the project in the 
hope that the situation would turn around. A study of practicing managers shows that 
many of them believed that they could turn their situations around in a variety of 
scenarios (Staw and Ross 1987). 
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Second, people are motivated by opportunities to overcome adversity, which allow them 
to demonstrate their abilities (Staw and Ross 1987). This is especially true if the 
adversity has resulted from the actions of others. In many organizations, managers who 
turn their situations around are more valued than those who sustain prior successes 
(Staw and Ross 1987). Indeed, history has credited many leaders who overcame 
difficulties and persisted till they succeeded (the hero effect) (Staw and Ross 1980). 
Hence, people might have remained undaunted in the face of adversity (pessimistically 
framed negative feedback) arising from the actions of their predecessor. 
 
Third, many people are accustomed to perceive competition as something healthy. The 
existence of competition indicates that the project outcome is valuable (Haunschild et al. 
1994; Teger 1980). Particularly when the perceived consequences of failure are not 
severe, the competition itself may even outweigh all other considerations when people 
are deciding whether to persist or withdraw. With this mental attitude, people might have 
chosen to continue with the project when confronted with competition (pessimistically 
framed negative feedback) in a situation where the perceived consequences of failure 
might not be severe (low accountability). 
 
Implications for Practice 
 
Given that this study employs artificial scenarios and student subjects, any attempts to 
generalize the findings to organizational settings and actual software project managers 
must be done with caution. Nevertheless, Staw and Ross (1987) note that the use of 
artificial scenarios and student subjects tends to dampen rather than amplify the results. 
Therefore, the actual effects of feedback direction, feedback optimism, and 
accountability may be even stronger in reality. By depicting a weaker picture of what 
may happen in practice, the results of this study have some useful implications. 
 
Managers of software projects (especially those pertaining to development of generic 
software packages) can benefit from having access to accurate and complete feedback, 
whether positive or negative. The tendency of many software teams to report only good 
news up the hierarchy and to suppress bad news (Keil and Robey 1999) should be 
strongly discouraged because such practices impair the management decision process. 
While nothing much can, or indeed should, be done to alter feedback (e.g., provide 
partial feedback or change feedback to please management), feedback optimism and 
accountability may be manipulated to facilitate software project management. 
 
The results of this study demonstrate that project managers may respond to feedback 
more rationally when they are highly accountable for projects. In other words, they 
exhibit greater willingness to continue with software projects when given positive rather 
than negative feedback, regardless of feedback optimism. This suggests that it may be 
useful to keep managers’ level of accountability high (Brockner et al. 1986). Possible 
ways to raise the level of accountability of software project managers include providing 
them with strong incentives for project success, allocating projects to them based on 
their interests, or allowing those who initiate projects to see the projects through to 
completion (Keil 1995; Sandelands et al. 1988). Results of this study also reveal that, 
under conditions of high accountability, project managers may have greater willingness 
to continue with software projects when provided with optimistically rather than 
pessimistically framed feedback, regardless of feedback direction. Hence, if software 
project managers can retain high accountability, framing positive feedback optimistically 
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and negative feedback pessimistically should not produce unexpected consequences. 
Given that positive feedback indicates good prospects for success, framing positive 
feedback optimistically may induce managers to persist with their projects and keep 
them from prematurely terminating these projects (Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski 1991; 
Newman and Sabherwal 1996). Given that negative feedback indicates poor prospects 
for success, framing negative feedback pessimistically may discourage managers from 
persisting with their projects and possibly succumbing to escalation of commitment 
tendencies (Keil 1995; Newman and Sabherwal 1996). 
 
In some situations, it may be extremely difficulty (if not impossible) to keep the level of 
accountability of software project managers high. For example, the management of 
some software projects may have to change hands due to personnel turnover or internal 
transfers (Keil and Robey 1999; Staw and Ross 1987), factors that are common in the 
software industry. Under such conditions of low accountability, the results of this study 
suggest that project managers may be less rational in reacting to feedback. Specifically, 
pessimistically framed negative feedback may cause them to have marginally greater 
willingness to continue with software projects (see Figure 3). Thus, when accountability 
is low, feedback on software projects should be framed optimistically as far as possible 
(Whyte 1991). When the feedback is positive, framing such feedback optimistically may 
spur managers to persist with promising projects. However, when the feedback is 
negative, framing such feedback optimistically may reduce its salience and lower the 
probability that managers will demonstrate escalation of commitment tendencies. 
External software consultants and organizational intelligence gathering groups 
(important sources of feedback for software project managers) may want to bear such 
findings in mind when preparing reports for software project managers. 
 
Implications for Research 
 
Researchers can pursue some avenues of further study. First, different levels of 
accountability may moderate the impact of feedback direction and optimism in different 
ways. This study uses a high accountability scenario involving a project champion (Staw 
and Ross 1987). Future studies can employ different high accountability scenarios (e.g., 
a manager whose rewards are aligned to software project success) to see if the additive 
effects of feedback direction and optimism would be weaker. Similarly, various low 
accountability scenarios can be studied in the future to verify the interactive effects of 
feedback direction and optimism. Examples of such scenarios include situations where 
people make collective project decisions (Whyte 1993), have ready scapegoats to take 
the blame (Leatherwood and Conlon 1987), or have good excuses to vindicate 
themselves (Staw and Ross 1987). 
 
Second, different types of positive and negative feedback may have different impact on 
willingness to continue with software projects. Feedback differs in terms of source (Staw 
and Ross 1987), equivocality (Bowen 1987), predictability (Leatherwood and Conlon 
1987), causality (Staw and Ross 1987), and timing (Drummond 1995). For example, 
negative feedback for software projects may indicate internal sources of problems (e.g., 
incessant changes in software requirements or high turnover among project members) 
or external sources of problems (e.g., unanticipated advances in technology or launch of 
competitive products). Project managers may be more resilient to internal than external 
problems because they are in a better position to address them and control the situation 
(Staw and Ross 1987). Alternatively, project managers may respond more aggressively 
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to external competition because market share may be critical to their businesses. Future 
studies can examine these issues. 
 
Third, while this study examines the framing of quantitative information about market 
share, future studies can assess the impact of framing qualitative information. With 
quantitative information, rational project managers can compare optimistically and 
pessimistically framed feedback for mathematical equivalence. But with qualitative 
information (e.g., rich text descriptions of project prospects), it is impossible to check for 
mathematical equivalence. The impact of qualitative information on willingness to 
continue with software projects may be less predictable because qualitative information 
may be interpreted differently by different project managers. Yet, feedback on software 
projects, including reports from external consultants, can often be qualitative in nature. 
Future research can examine whether and how qualitative information may be framed as 
well as the impact of such framing efforts on willingness to continue with software 
projects. 
 
Limitations of This Study 
 
First, this study employed a research experiment involving artificial scenarios and 
student subjects. Also, the three independent variables have been operationalized using 
concise rather than extended descriptions. Though this research approach results in 
strong internal validity, the results may lack generalizability. For tasks involving human 
information processing and decision making (as in this study), researchers have 
suggested that the use of student subjects would not invalidate the results (Ashton and 
Kramer 1980; Garland and Newport 1991; Staw and Ross 1987). Nevertheless, it would 
still be useful to validate the findings of this study in the context of real software project 
scenarios and actual software project managers. 
 
Second, to keep the research experiment manageable, the number of factors 
manipulated and studied had to be kept small (three factors in this case). In reality, a 
plethora of other factors also affect management decisions on whether or not to continue 
with software projects. Also, to enhance the internal validity, the three factors under 
study had to be operationalized using strong manipulations (see Sections 3.1 to 3.3) so 
as to induce statistical differences (if these exist). In reality, these factors may exist in 
other weaker modes (see Section 5.4). For example, we manipulated feedback using 
clear market share figures, following Whyte (1991). In reality, software project managers 
may receive incomplete or inaccurate feedback due to lack of resources or time, or 
because some information is simply unavailable. These project managers would have to 
work within constraints of incomplete or inaccurate feedback (weaker modes of 
feedback) when making their decisions. 
 
Third, the subjects in this study played the role of project managers who were currently 
managing a software project. Given the experimental scenarios (see Section 3.4), they 
were implicitly supporting (or at least not opposing) the software project. The subjects 
were never asked to take the perspective of project managers who opposed the 
software project. Thus, when given pessimistically framed positive feedback from the 
consultant, the subjects might have found it difficult to comprehend why the consultant 
should frame the positive feedback using a pessimistic tone. Similarly, in practice, 
consultants may frame positive feedback using optimistic or pessimistic tones 
(intentionally or unintentionally). However, project managers who do not oppose the 
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software project may also find it difficult to relate to positive feedback that has been 
pessimistically framed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study depicts how accountability may moderate the impact of feedback direction 
and optimism on human decisions pertaining to software projects. In summary, the 
effects of feedback direction and optimism on willingness to continue with software 
projects were additive when accountability was high but were interactive when 
accountability was low. These results contribute to the software project management 
literature in two important ways. First, they generate new insights on how software 
project managers may make decisions in the context of confirmatory (optimistic framing 
of positive feedback or pessimistic framing of negative feedback) or contradictory 
evidence (pessimistic framing of positive feedback or optimistic framing of negative 
feedback). Second, these results yield some clues about how the effects of feedback 
direction and optimism on the decisions of software project managers may differ in high 
accountability conditions (which has been the domain of prior research) versus low 
accountability conditions (which is particularly applicable to software projects, given high 
personnel turnover). 
 
As the software market becomes more global, and as organizations increasingly 
purchase software packages from vendors around tn bhe world, software projects 
(particularly those involving development of generic software packages) face tougher 
competition and become more challenging to manage. To help software project 
managers cope with these challenges, factors driving critical management decisions 
(which affect software project success) must be better understood (Keil et al. 2000; 
Newman and Sabherwal 1996). The intricate relationship among three such factors 
(feedback direction, feedback optimism, and accountability) has been unraveled in this 
study. Future studies toward this end can yield valuable knowledge on software project 
management. 
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APPENDIX 
 
This Appendix summarizes the experimental materials given to subjects. Depending on 
their accountability treatment, subjects received one of the two accountability scenarios. 
Also, depending on their feedback direction and feedback optimism treatments, subjects 
received one of the four feedback direction/feedback optimism scenarios. 
 
CompuSys Corporation 
Instructions 
The case below is adapted from a genuine business scenario. Please read the case and 
answer all questions that follow based on your personal opinions. There are no right or 
wrong answers. When you have completed, please return the case to the administrator. 
 
Case 
You are a Director of CompuSys Corporation, a computer software company. Your 
company has been working on a CONFIG software project (developing a generic 
database system with advanced artificial intelligence capabilities for sale in the market). 
The CONFIG software should appeal to major computer hardware companies because it 
can potentially help to boost computer hardware sales by facilitating the work of sales 
representatives. To generate sales, sales representatives need to put together a set of 
computer hardware components that are compatible with each other and, when 
combined, will result in a complete and functioning computer system for their customers. 
The CONFIG software can help sales representatives with this complex task of 
customizing computer systems to meet customer needs. Another computer software 
company is also working on a CHAMPFIG software project that has the same objectives 
as the CONFIG project. 
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At the beginning of the CONFIG project, your company had engaged an external 
consultant to carry out a market study involving CONFIG and CHAMPFIG. The external 
consultant had concluded that CONFIG and CHAMPFIG would each capture 50% of the 
total market demand. 
 
High accountability scenario (heading not shown in actual case) 
You are the champion of the CONFIG project. You were solely responsible for 
persuading top management to initiate the CONFIG project. You have been asked to 
take charge of the CONFIG project since its inception. You are currently managing the 
CONFIG project. 
 
Low accountability scenario (heading not shown in actual case) 
You are not the champion of the CONFIG project. Your predecessor was solely 
responsible for persuading top management to initiate the CONFIG project. You have 
been asked to take charge the CONFIG project when your predecessor left the 
company. You are currently managing the CONFIG project. 
 
Your company is now midway through the CONFIG project (50% of the budget has been 
spent and 50% of the project has been completed). Eager to have a clearer picture of 
the current market situation, your company has engaged the same external consultant to 
carry out a follow-up market study involving CONFIG and CHAMPFIG. The consultant 
has just concluded the study and reported their findings. 
 
Positive feedback, optimistic framing scenario (heading not shown in actual case) 
The consultant observes that the total market demand for such software products has 
remained the same as their initial assessment at the beginning of the CONFIG project. 
Sales representatives from computer hardware companies are still interested in using 
such software products to facilitate their work. Besides CONFIG and CHAMPFIG, no 
other comparable software products would be available in the market in the foreseeable 
future. Based on their current assessment, the consultant concludes that the CONFIG 
software would capture 75% of the total market demand. 
 
Negative feedback, optimistic framing scenario (heading not shown in actual case) 
The consultant observes that the total market demand for such software products has 
remained the same as their initial assessment at the beginning of the CONFIG project. 
Sales representatives from computer hardware companies are still interested in using 
such software products to facilitate their work. Besides CONFIG and CHAMPFIG, no 
other comparable software products would be available in the market in the foreseeable 
future. Based on their current assessment, the consultant concludes that the CONFIG 
software would capture 25% of the total market demand. 
 
Positive feedback, pessimistic framing scenario (heading not shown in actual case) 
The consultant observes that the total market demand for such software products has 
remained the same as their initial assessment at the beginning of the CONFIG project. 
Sales representatives from computer hardware companies are still interested in using 
such software products to facilitate their work. Besides CONFIG and CHAMPFIG, no 
other comparable software products would be available in the market in the foreseeable 
future. Based on their current assessment, the consultant concludes that the CONFIG 
software would fail to capture 25% of the total market demand. 
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Negative feedback, pessimistic framing scenario (heading not shown in actual case) 
The consultant observes that the total market demand for such software products has 
remained the same as their initial assessment at the beginning of the CONFIG project. 
Sales representatives from computer hardware companies are still interested in using 
such software products to facilitate their work. Besides CONFIG and CHAMPFIG, no 
other comparable software products would be available in the market in the foreseeable 
future. Based on their current assessment, the consultant concludes that the CONFIG 
software would fail to capture 75% of the total market demand. 
 
Your Decision 
After receiving the report from the consultant, you have to make an important decision 
pertaining to the CONFIG project. What is the probability that you will continue with the 
CONFIG project (please circle the appropriate percentage below)? 
 
Definitely 
not continue 
       Definitely
continue
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Your Opinions 
Please answer the following questions (by circling the appropriate number). 
  Strongly 
disagree 
 Strongly
agree
1.  The consultant’s report is good news for the 
CONFIG project. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.  The consultant’s market share assessment shows 
that the CONFIG project has good prospects. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.  The consultant adopts an optimistic attitude when 
preparing the report. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  The consultant takes a positive perspective when 
presenting the findings. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  I am accountable for the success of the CONFIG 
project. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.  The outcome of the CONFIG project is important to 
me. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your Details 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. 
1. Age: _____ years 
2. Work experience: _____ years 
3. Gender: Female / Male 
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